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Solar


(an extract from Sustaining U.S.-China Cooperation in Clean Energy by Merritt T. Cooke and forthcoming in late December 2011 from the Kissinger Institute of the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars)

see http://www.scribd.com/doc/74298679/Sustaining-U-S-China-Cooperation-in-Clean-Energy-Cover-Table-of-Contents-Intro







Interestingly, the market picture for the photovoltaic solar industry in China is almost the reverse image of what we have just seen for wind energy.  With wind energy, China has a domestic market to fall back on if it is rebuffed in its market entry into the U.S.  With solar, China is entirely dependent on continued access to Western export markets because China has not yet, to date, established any domestic market for its solar production.

 

To start from a broad perspective, it should be noted that the solar industry worldwide is divided into two major sectors.  The largest, and most commonly thought of, sector is photovoltaic (PV) solar.  This technology  employs 'micro-chips' on solar panels that manage the direct photovoltaic conversion from sunlight to transmission-ready electricity.  Photovoltaic is the technology commonly seen on the rooftops of private homes as well as in utility-scale arrays in ‘solar-farm’ fields.  The second sector of solar technology which offers comparable long-term promise as a source for renewable energy is thermal solar.  In contrast to PV, thermal solar technology uses the direct energy of sunlight for various heating and/or electricity conversion processes.  These can range from simple solar-heating units on rooftops to heat the water for building occupants to extraordinarily complex and precise arrays of mirrors that can redirect tens of thousands of beams of light to superheat synthetic fluids which in turn boil water to power  steam-turbines for large-scale electricity conversion. 

 

We will be focusing mostly in this section on dynamics in the global photovoltaic industry.  But before leaving the topic of solar thermal, we should note in passing that China is already the world's largest market for installations of simple and inexpensive solar-heating rooftop units.  Under cloudy conditions, these units do not always provide occupants the most satisfying temperature for their hot showers but they conserve a significant amount of energy that would otherwise have to be generated by coal or other carbon-based sources.  At the other end of the spectrum of sophisticated thermal technologies are the vast arrays currently under experimentation in some of the world’s biggest deserts.  The grandest of these experiments, Desertec, is currently under construction in North Africa as a German-led, EU- and World Bank-backed effort that could potentially supply Europe, via a trans-Mediterranean high-voltage transmission line, with 15% of its energy needs. A step-down in scale from Desertec, a California start-up, eSolar, backed by $40 million of funding from GE, has a licensing deal with Chinese power equipment maker Penglai Electric to build 2GW of solar thermal projects in Shaanxi Province and other locations over the next ten years.  Solar thermal power is promising but still at an early stage of development.


PV solar is where the strongest global competition is currently taking place with China in the thick of the action.   This is, in fact, a boom industry in China. As an investment sector, it enjoys relatively low barriers of entry compared to other high technology fields,  can take full advantage of China’s relatively low labor and facility costs, and can piggy-back on the global primacy  Asia has established in the related manufacturing field of low-cost memory chips for the computer industry.

To illustrate this point, a single city in Shandong province, Dezhou, alone is home to more than 100 PV manufacturers. The recent high profile issue of tight polysilicon supply in global markets shows clearly the government support backing this industry sector in China.  In late 2010, when this critical supply input for the industry dried up in global markets, the full state apparatus of the PRC central government went into gear to assure supply for the sector, a story well described by the Wall Street Journal in November 2010[1].  With supply being ramped up by 'investor euphoria' factors and with domestic demand limited by the State Grid's ability to integrate new PV-generated power into its national grid, prices in China started dropping precipitously. But with state support for the industry evident in unclogging the polysilicon bottleneck, Chinese solar producers took heart.  The plight for the plethora of start-ups in China was no longer an existential question of “Will I survive” but now a more zero-sum question of “How much market share can I grab under current conditions[2].”  As reported by RenewableEnergyWorld.com in September 2010, "the late-August round of bids for utility-scale solar power projects in China yielded a new milestone in the economics of solar power in China: a sub-Yuan/kWh price for solar power. To achieve this impressive number, the Chinese government has used the state-owned sector (and particularly enterprises under the direct control of the central government) to help subsidize the price of solar power, to the point where the economics appear to be unsustainable."


What makes this ‘Chinese story’ problematic in a global sense is that, unlike the wind sector, China has, relatively speaking, no established domestic market for PV solar production.  This is readily shown by a graphic representing the size and growth prospects of the PV solar market in comparison with the wind energy market.




What this means is that the output of China’s recent hyper-production needs to be absorbed in export markets.  Because cost-of-production is less important to Chinese manufacturers than sales volume, the oversupply situation in China leads to falling prices in international markets.

By the end of 2010, this situation had already yielded a 30% global share for China and a growing international backlash as P&L-driven companies in the U.S. and other export markets[1] succumbed to this wave of imports from China.  The global ranking of PV manufacturing expansion in 2010 tells the story clearly with Chinese companies occupying seven of the ten ranked slots.




As a result, the Obama Administration is under increasing pressure in 2011 to broaden its trade actions against China in the renewable energy category to include PV solar products.

However, despite these pressures, the U.S. industry is demonstrating remarkable  innovativeness and resilience at the higher value end of the market.  The U.S. Government has funded a new national Energy Innovation Hub for Solar Technology led by CalTech.  There is currently no major bilateral effort on-going between the U.S. and China in the PV solar area, either at the level of U.S.- China Clean Energy Research Center (CERC) cooperation or non-official public/private partnership channels.

 

At the private sector level, some high-profile efforts have managed to withstand these whipsaw pressures and to find partnership common ground with China. The most notable of these is the plan by First Solar Inc, headquartered in Arizona, to cooperate with China Guangdong Nuclear Solar Energy Development Co. Ltd. to develop the world's largest solar power plant in Ordos, Inner Mongolia. The memorandum of understanding for this project, signed in January 2011, envisions a 2,000-megawatt solar power plant for thin-film transistor (TFT) solar PV modules to be built in phases over the next ten years.





[1] The preponderant  share of Chinese exports went to European markets where subsidy levels were more generous than in the U.S.  However, just as Chinese manufacturers were ramping up 2011 production at levels of 50-100% above 2010 , austerity-minded European governments began cutting their subsidy programs by even larger levels. 



[1] Wall Street Journal,  November 16, 2010,  page 1, by Jason Dean, Andrew Brown and Shai Oster

[2] Some readers may recall that this is exactly the question which the business plans of Internet companies in Silicon Valley were asking before the dot-com shakeout in April 2000.